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ISSUES
Winning a legal case depends as much on presenting
the issues to the court at the appropriate time and in the
appropriate manner (following procedural rules), as it
does on persuading the court of the merits of the case
(arguing substantive law).
This case raises questions on both the procedural
and substantive levels. At what point in a lawsuit must
the issue of federal preemption be raised and to what
extent is state law preempted by federal labor law? The
answers to these questions will clarify the rules of proce-
dure for litigating cases involving federal preemption
issues, and further refine the substantive reach of fed-
eral preemption in the field of labor law.
FACTS
In 1981, Larry Davis was employed as a ship superin-
tendent by Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Company at the
port of Mobile, Alabama. He became dissatisfied with
his wage rate and began to discuss with other superin-
tendents the possibility of organizing a union. Ben
Trione, another Ryan-Walsh superintendent, contacted
the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA),
and arranged a meeting at which an ILA representative
would discuss the organizing campaign.
At the meeting, many of the superintendents were
reluctant to sign union authorization cards for fear that
the employer might retaliate and they would lose their
jobs. The ILA representative allegedly assured the su-
perintendents that if they were fired for their union
activities, the ILA would get their jobs back for them
with backpay. After the meeting, signed authorization
cards, including Davis's, were collected and several of
the superintendents, including Davis, signed an applica-
don for a charter to establish a new local union of the
ILA.
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The next day, Trione was fired by Ryan-Walsh for
his union activities. Tile ILA filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), alleging that the discharge violated sections 8
(a) (I) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The charge was subsequently administratively
dismissed by the Regional Director, who stated that
Trione was a supervisor and therefore not protected
under the NLRA.
Shortly thereafter, Ryan-Walsh fired Davis because
he persisted in his efforts to organize the ship superin-
tendents. Davis, however, did not file a charge with the
NLRB; rather he filed a lawsuit in state court against the
ILA for fraud and misrepresentation under Alabama
law. The complaint alleged that in reliance on the know-
ingly false misrepresentations made by the ILA that ship
superintendents could legally join a union and the ILA
would get them their jobs back if fired, Davis signed the
authorization card and charter application. At the com-
pletion of the trial, thejury returned a general verdict in
favor of Davis and awarded him $75,000 in damages. It
was at this point in the proceedings that the ILA, in a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, first
raised the issue of federal preemption--claiming that
federal labor law regulating union organizing activity
under the NLRA supersedes applying the Alabama stat-
utory law of misrepresentation to that same activity. The
trial judge denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment and
held that the ILA had not timely presented the issue of
federal preemption and therefore had failed to preserve
the issue for review (470 So. 2d 1215 (1985)). The court
found thatederal preemption is an affirmative defense
which must be raised in the pleadings or it will be consid-
ered waived.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The threshold issue, whether federal preemption is a
waivable defense, is a procedural one and carries ramifi-
cations beyond the field of labor law. The concept of
preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause in the
Constitution, which mandates that federal law super-
sedes conflicting state law and that federal regulation of
a specific field may totally occupy that field to the exclu-
sion of parallel state regulation. As such, the doctrine of
preemption arises not only in labor law but in other
areas of federal regulation, such as immigration, food
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and drug regulation, pension plans and interstate com-
merce.
If the issue of federal preemption of state law deals
with the subject matter jurisdiction of a state court, then
it is an issue which may be raised at any time, even on
appeal, and can never be waived. Subject matter juris-
diction implicates the very authority of a court to hear
the case; if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is
deprived of any power to decide the case. Any decision
by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void
from the beginning. Under this view of preemption, the
court was required to rule on the merits of the ILA's
preemption argument, regardless of when the issue was
raised.
However, if preemption is viewed not as limiting the
state court's jurisdiction over the field allegedly
preempted, but rather as depriving the court of its abil-
ity to apply state law to the field, then preemption may
be classified as an affirmative defense. The defense
would assert that assuming the complaint states a mer-
itorious claim under state law, a defendant is not liable
because federal law overrides application of state law.
An affirmative defense much be raised in a timely
fashion or it is deemed to have been waived. Under this
view of preemption, the court was not obligated to de-
cide the preemption claim since it was not timely raised
as an issue.
The substantive issue involved in this case-whether
the NLRA preempts the application of Alabama's law of
misrepresentation to the ILA's organizing activity-will
only be decided if the Court initially finds that the
preemption issue was timely raised. The contours of
federal preemption of state regulation in the field of
labor law are not rigidly defined, although the Court
over the last few sessions has attempted to more clearly
delimit the interplay between federal and state law in
this field.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (359 U.S.
236 (1959)) established the general guidelines for defin-
ing the permissible scope of state regulation of activity
touching upon labor-management relations. State law is
preempted from being applied to activity which is actu-
ally or arguably protected or prohibited under the
NLRA, unless the activity which the state seeks to regu-
late touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility. A subsequent Supreme Court case, Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters (436
U.S. 180 (1978)), identified another exception to the
general preemptive effect of federal law in the field of
labor relations. Where activity is only arguably protected
or prohibited by the NLRA, applying state law by the
state court is not preempted where the claim arising
from the activity is different from any claims which
would be considered by the NLRB.
Applying these general preemption principles to the
facts of this case is complicated by a dispute over Davis's
status as an employee or supervisor. Supervisors are not
covered under the NLRA; therefore, organization activ-
ity involving supervisors is neither protected nor prohib-
ited. The question of whether an individual is a
supervisor under the Act, however, is itself an issue
controlled by federal labor law.
In resolving the substantive issue concerning the
scope of the NLRA's preemptive effect over state law,
the Court will have the opportunity to further clarify the
extent of the exceptions to the preemption doctrine. In
clarifying the reach of the exceptions, the boundaries of
state regulation over labor relations activities could be
broadened or narrowed. If the exceptions to preemp-
tion are broadened, the possibility of imposing conflict-
ing or multiplicitous obligations on the parties increases
-the very problem which preemption was meant to
prevent.
ARGUMENTS
For the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO
(Counsel of Record, Thomas W. Gleason, 26 Broadway, 17th
Floor, New York, NY 10004; telephone (212)425-3240)
1. A claim of federal preemption is addressed to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the state court and
therefore is nonwaivable and may be raised at any
time.
2. A holding that preemption can be timely raised at any
point does not necessarily allow a litigant "two bites at
the same apple," as a court is under a duty to recog-
nize and decide, on its own initiative, the issue of
preemption, without having to wait for a litigant to
raise the defense.
3. Alabama is preempted from applying its law of mis-
representation to the facts of this case. Appeals for
union membership are arguably protected under the
NLRA, and fraudulent representations to induce
union membership are prohibited. Any interest
wvhich Alabama has in protecting its citizens from
misleading solicitations is outweighed by the risk of
interference with the NLRA's regulation of that same
conduct.
4. Although the NLRA does not regulate organizing
activity engaged in by supervisors, there has been no
clear determination by the NLRB that Davis was a
supervisor. The Regional Director's finding that
Trione was a supervisor did not determine the status
of any other superintendent. Neither was that finding
a determinative one, since it was subject to review by
the General Counsel. In the absence of a clear deter-
mination by the NLRB on this supervisory issue, the
activity in question is arguably protected and state law
is preempted.
5. For ajury to decide the ILA engaged in misrepresen-
tation, it would have to find that the superintendents
were supervisors. The issue of supervisory status,
however, is one which would have had to be deter-
Issue No. 10 97A,
mined by the NLRB if the organizing drive had cul-
minated in a representation petition filed by the ILA.
Thus, Davis's claim in state court is not different from
a claim which could arise before the NLRB.
6. Even if state law was not preempted, applying a strict
liability theory of misrepresentation as well as the
award of excessive punitive damages is contrary to
the policies underlying the federal labor laws.
For Larry Davis (Counsel of Record, Bayless E. Biles, Post
Office Box 1140, Bay Minette, AL 36507; telephone (205)
937-7024)
1. The claim filed by Davis sounded in tort. The state
court clearly has jurisdiction over tort law claims.
Preemption effects only the state court's exercise of
its legitimate power, thus constituting an affirmative
defense which under Alabama's rules of procedure
must be timely pleaded or it is considered waived.
2. Davis's status as a supervisor did not have to be deter-
mined by the NLRB. Given the clear statutory defi-
nition of supervisor contained in the NLRA, Trione's
testimony in the state court case concerning a supe-
rintendent's duties and the Regional Director's ruling
that Trione was a supervisor, Davis's supervisory sta-
tus was clearly established under federal law and such
status could be recognized by the state court.
3. Since Davis was a supervisor, the activity in question is
not regulated by federal law and the application of
state law is not preempted. The issues raised by Da-
vis's fraud claim are not identical to any issues which
could be raised before the NLRB.
4. Even if the conduct in question is arguably protected
or prohibited under the NLRA, the question of fraud
is of only peripheral concern to federal labor policies,
whereas the state has a substantial interest in protect-
ing its citizens from misrepresentations which may
cause them harm.
5. The ILA failed to timely object to the strict liability
theory and there is no indication that the jury's ver-
dict was based on that theory as opposed to an inten-
tional misrepresentation theory.
6. The verdict is not excessive and there is no federal
policy for prohibiting punitive damages for intentio-
nally tortious conduct.
AMICUS BRIEF
In Support of Larry Davis
A joint brief was filed by the Council of State Gov-
ernments, International City Management Association,
National Governors' Association, U.S. Conference of
Mayors, National Conference of State Legislatures, Na-
tional League of Cities and National Association of
Counties.
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